We suggest a method of controlling the access to a secure database via quorum systems. A quorum system is a collection of sets (quorums) every two of which have a nonempty intersection. Quorum systems have been used for a number of applications in the area of distributed systems.
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A vishai Woolt protocol to enforce this licensing policy. The protocol should run using a wide-spread collection of access servers, which may be completely separate from the actual data servers. A basic part of this protocol is just maintaining a consistent view of the licensing status of every customer, which is a classical question concerning replicated databases. Note that servers may be unavailable due to crashes or communication failures, so the protocol needs to overcome this and allow high availability of the service. On the other hand, the protocol should keep the load on any single server at a minimum.
The information in the database is highly sensitive so it must be protected. The protection should be against cheating users, rather than against dishonest access server personnel. The first requirement is that a user may not know any partial data relating to photographs that were not paid for, so the protection needs to be done per record. A second requirement is that after the license expires, and GlobePic takes the few necessary measures to update the access servers, the user is not allowed to access any photographs at all. A crucial point is that a typical replicateddatabase protocol does not update all the servers that the license has expired, so a cheating user may attempt to access the outdated servers, who still believe the license is valid, and thus obtain access to the photographs. Note that the access control needs to be enforced even when the whole raw database is available to a cheating user.
A closely related problem concerns distributed signatures. Suppose that the SolarCard credit company has an agreement with the Lunar Bank, which specifies a secure signature scheme. Any card-holder showing an officially signed letter of credit from SolarCard is entitled to receive from Lunar Bank the amount requested in the letter, and the credit card company is bound to reimburse the bank of the sum. Now SolarCard wishes to create an automatic signing service for its customers, via some signature servers.
A common approach to such a problem is that the user must obtain partial signatures from k of the n servers, so that fewer than k servers cannot forge a complete signature. This approach ensures both a high availability, and minimal trust in the servers. We choose to separate these issues, by trusting the servers to a large extent. However, as in the previous scenario, we assume that the servers may not all have the updated status of each customer. We argue that an important issue here is consistency: if the request is valid then it should be signed, but if it is not then no matter which servers the user applies to, the request must not be signed. Note that k-of-n signature schemes with k < n/2 do not guarantee this type of consistency even when all the servers are not corrupt. And of course a basic requirement is that cheating user should not be able to forge a signature even after receiving several partial signatures.
A solution to the problems of both scenarios includes the idea. of a quorum system. This is a. collection of sets (called quorums) every two o:fwhich have a non-empty intersection. Quorum systems are .a standard tool used to maintain consistency in replicated databases. A natural formulation for the access control problem is that access to the data m;ty be granted only by a quorum of servers. Then the intersection property guarantees that notifying all the servers in some quorum that a license has expired would make the license useless. Similarly in the signature problem, we say that only a. quorum of partial signatures can be combined into a full signature, and then the intersection property guarantees the consistency.
Our purpose in this paper is to show how to add the security requirements to some of the better quorum systems, via secret sharing. The security we guarantee is against user's actions; we assume that the servers are trustworthy, but possibly unavailable or out of date. We obtain an access control protocol that has the following properties:
• Access controlled at record (rather than database) granularity.
• Very low overhead in terms of communication and computation for gaining the access.
• Low probability of denial-of-service or of giving service to an unauthorized user.
• No on-line coordination required between the servers; i.e., a. user simply gets information from the servers.
We believe that the level of trust which we assume for the servers is reasonable in applications similar to the ones sketched above. However we consider decreasing this trust, without significant degradation of the protocol's advantages, to be a. major open question.
Related Work
Herlihy and Tygar [20] have suggested a scheme to protect quorum based replicated databases. However their scheme has several drawbacks: access is controlled over the whole database and not at record granularity, there is no way to revoke a. user's access once it is obtained, and the scheme uses a k-of-n threshold access structure, which implies a. large communication overhe.a.d and high load since the threshold must be k > n/2 for the structure to be a. quorum system.
Reiter and Birman [39] considered a database protection scheme in a. scenario which is the reverse of ours, namely against servers being corrupted (rather then the users, as is the underlining assumption in our paper). In their scheme it is the responsibility of the users to verify that the the data. sent by the servers is genuine. They too rely on a. k-ofn threshold scheme, and do not separate between the data. servers and the access servers. The issue of availability is addressed by Gong [18] , in the context of a. secure authentication service. The suggested protocol uses a. k-of-n threshold scheme, however in fact any secret sharing scheme could be used instead. Therefore if we replace the k-of-n scheme by our quorum secret sharing schemes, the protocol would then gain their efficiency, high availability and low load.
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A related line of research is that of group signatures [10] and function sharing [9] : for processors to share a function F means that only a group of k processors can evaluate F( x), and no information is transferred about F from the shares related to x. Hence, the issue of granularity is dealt with. However, their model of failures and security requirements are much more severe: the servers themselves may be corrupted, and no set of < k corrupt servers is allowed to know any information about F. The corrupted servers are controlled by a malicious adversary, who knows all the secret information they may possess. They showed how to share the RSA function (i.e., modular exponentiation) over a threshold access structure. However, since the security requirements here are stronger than ours, the problems they face are more difficult and therefore: (i) The solutions obtained are more complex than ours. (ii) They work only over threshold structures. (iii) It is not clear how to solve the problem of database encryption given this assumption on the faulty servers. The problem is in sharing a pseudorandom function.
1
(iv) As for signatures, their scheme is restricted to RSA and is not general. In particular it is not clear whether any of the provably secure signature schemes may be implemented.
Tools
Quorum systems: Quorum systems have been used in the study of distributed control and management problems such as mutual exclusion (cf. [13, 38] ), data replication protocol.q (cf. [8, 19, 23] ), name servers (cf. [32] ) <•nd selective dissemination of information ( cf. [44] ). We apply some recent constructions suggested in (33, ~:7] .
Secret sharing: Secret sharing was originally suggested for threshold access structures by Sha.mir and Blakely [40, 4] . lt was extended to arbitrary access structures in [22] . The issue of efficiency (i.e., share sizes) of such schemes has been considered in several papers ( cf. [6, 5, 2] ). Schemes suggested in [3] for structures represented by monotone formulas turn out to be important for our quorum systems. The most general access structures for which efficient secret sharing schemes are known is that of span programs [24] . All our schemes fall into this category. Krawczyk [25] suggested the notion of computational secret sharing which we adopt for our purposes.
Pseudo-random functions: Our constructions employ pseudo-random functions ( cf. [16, 28] ) for two purposes: encrypting the database and generating coin flips for the secret sharing schemes we use. As a. heuristic, it is possible to replace the pseudo-random function with a. private-key encryption function, such as DES.
Signatures: Digital signatures have been investigated extensively ( cf. [17, 11] and the references therein). Our scheme can take any signature scheme and tra.nsfmm it into a. distributed quorum based scheme, without altering its security. The notion of security we consider is that of existential unforgeability. However our transformation is independent of the basic signa.tme scheme itself, so we can as easily create a quorum signature scheme out of heuristic signature schemes, such as RSA with MD5.
New Results
In this work we propose a separation between the access servers and the data servers. The data servers need not be be physically protected, since all the information on them will be encrypted. We shall assume, however, that none of the access servers has been compromised, although some of them may not be up-to-date regarding the access privileges of users. This may be due to communication failure or high load, or since quorum based data replication schemes allow data not to be updated at all the servers. The access servers have relatively low storage requirements, typically much less than that of the database itself. We make use of quorum systems to enforce consistency of the access information. When a legitimate user Bob wants to access a record from the database, or to obtain a signature, he sends a request to all the servers in some quorum of access servers. Each of these servers, after checking authorization, sends back a message. In the case where Bob wants to get a record from the database, he also accesses the data servers and gets the encrypted record. No protection (other than encryption) is assumed on the data servers. Combining the messages Bob gets from the access servers yields the key to decrypting the record, or yields the desired signature. However if an unauthorized user Alice attempts the same procedure, she will get only a subset of replies (from the outdated servers). We show that this partial information will not be help her to forge the signature or to learn any information regarding the database which she did not have before.
The properties that interest us in a quorum systems are:
• Low load (and high capacity): the load of a quorum system is the fraction of the time that a member of the quorum system (server) is accessed under the best possible strategy of choosing quorums. Thus to allow many accesses to the database, we need a low load.
• High availability: we want a quorum of available servers to exist with high probability even when individual servers may fail. This ensures that privileges may be revoked, and that legitimate users may continue accessing the database (or obtaining signatures).
• Small quorum sizes: to make the communication overhead small.
Note that not all quorum systems enjoy these properties. For instance, the majority system [42] , i.e., the ~-of-n threshold system, has optimal availability but induces a high load and has large quorums. At the other extreme, the finite projective plane [29] has optimal load but very poor availability. We suggest using some recent constructions of quorum systems that have optimal performance according to the above criteria. We show how to convert secret sharing schemes for access structures corresponding to these quorum systems into solutions for our problems. Our main results, specified in Theorems 3.1 and 5.1, show how the transformations work, and their security properties. As a consequence we get very efficient methods for protecting information in a database, or generating shared signatures. The work done 159 at a server given a request is the evaluation of an encryption function at two points. Reconstruction by a user is also very efficient and involves XORing mostly. Our schemes require no coordination between the servers. Each server replies to a request based only on information it holds locally, and the consistency is guaranteed by the fact that obtaining replies from less than a quorum of servers does not leak information to the user. .
Organization: the next section contains the definitions of quorum systems, their properties, and secret sharing schemes. Section 3 presents how to use a quorum secret sharing scheme to control the access to a database. Section 4 includes some variants to the basic protocol, with stronger security guarantees. Section 5 shows how a secret sharing scheme can be used to convert signature schemes into ones controlled by a quorum system. Section 6 gives efficient secret sharing schemes for various quorum systems, that may be used in the methods of Section 3 and 5. Section 7 describes two protocol variants which require less trust in the servers, and Section 8 lists some open problems. 
Alternatively, quorum systems are known as intersecting set systems or as intersecting hypergraphs. The sets of the system are called quorums. The number of elements in the underlying universe is denoted by n = I U 1.
The availability of a quorum system is defined using a simple probabilistic model of the failures in the system. We assume that the elements (servers) fail independently with a fixed uniform probability p. We assume that the failures are transient, that the failures are crash failures (i.e., a failed element stops to function rather than functions incorrectly), and that they are detectable. Following [36] we define: Definition 2.2 For every quorum Q E Q let £q be the event that Q is hit, i.e., at least one element i E Q has failed. Let fail(Q) be the event that all the quorums Q E Q were hit, i.e., fail( Q) = nQEQ £q. Let the system failure probability be Fp( Q) = IP(fail( Q)).
The failure probability Fp( Q) measures the un-availability of the quorum system Q.
In order to define the load, we first need the notion of a strategy. A protocol using a quorum system occasionally needs to access quorums during its run. A strategy is a probabilistic rule that governs which quorum is chosen each time. In other words, a strategy gives the probability that. a quorum Qj will be picked. Definition 2.3 Let a quorum system Q = ( Q1, ... , Qm) be given over a universe U. Then w E [0, 1]m is a strategy for Q if it is a probability distribution over the quorums Qj E Q, i.e., 2::7: 1 Wj = 1.
For every element i E U, a strategy w of picking quorums induces a probability that the element i is accessed, which we call the load on i. The system load, .C( Q), is the load on the busiest element induced by the best possible strategy. Formally, following [33] : Definition 2.4 Let u strategy w be given for a quorum system Q = (Qt, ... , Qm) over a universe U. For an elt:ment i E U, the load induced by won i is lw(i) = LQ·"·Wj.
The load induced by a strategy w on a quorum systt~m Q is .Cw(Q) = max;eu fw(i). The system load on a quorum system Q is .C( Q) = minw { .Cw ( Q)}, where the minimum is taken over all strateg1ies w. 
Secret

Every subset not in A can not reveal any partial information about the secret (in the information theoretic sense). Formally, for any subset Z ¢A, for every two secrets a, b E S, and for every possible collection of shares {s;};ez :
JP'({11;};ezla) = lP'({s;};ezlb),
where the probability is taken over the random string r.
We denote the share of element i by II; ( s, r).
Let lxl denote the bit length of a value x. For a secret s we cannot expect the length of the shares to be IIT;(s, r)l < lsi, hence the total length of the shares is at least nisi-The following definition lets us measure the deviation of an SSS from the ideal space requirement.
Definition 2.7
The blowup factor of an SSS II is ,B(II) = 3 Access Control vi<1 Quorum Secret Sharing
Overview
In this section we show that an SSS II that realizes a quorum access structure A(Q) can be used to build a distributed access control mechanism for a database.
The main elements of the access control are the access servers, which form the universe U. Each server holds a list of all the users it knows to be currently authorized to access the database. However a server's authorization list may be outdated. It may be the case that user Alice has had her authorization revoked, but a set Z ~ U of servers is still unaware of this change when Alice requests access
PRF' with a seed 0'.
(A2) Let II be an SSS that realizes an access structure A. Each server i has a procedure to compute its share, II;(s, r).
(A3) The servers have the encryption PRF Keycr(x), and an additional PRF R-y(x), with a private seed ' "' (, used to generate pseudo-random coin flips for the SSS.
Authorization check: When server i receives a request to access data item x from a user, it checks the authorization. If the request is from an unauthorized user, the server replies "REFUSE".
Share Generation: If the request is from an authorized user Bob, the server generates k = Key 0 (x) and a pseudo-random string r =
R-y(x).
Server i then computes its share of the key, s; = II;(k, r) using the SSS, and sends s;
to Bob.
Reconstruction: When Bob collects the shares s; from a set of servers A E A, he obtains the key using the reconstruction function for the set A, k = hA( { s;};eA)· With the key he can decrypt permtsswn. Our requirement is that if all the servers in some quorum Q E Q are informed that Alice is no longer authorized, then no matter from which set of servers Alice chooses to request access permission, she will not be a.ble to access the database. This requirement leads naturally to our basic pan~digm:
To access the database, a user must obtain permission from a quorum of access servers.
The intersection property of a quorum system then ensures that in any set A E A(Q) (which can collectively grant permission to Alice), at least one server is informed that the request is not legitimate. We assume also that an access server may be unavailable (due to a crash or communication failure). We would ]like such failures not to prevent legitimate users from obtaining access, and not to allow non-legitimate users to break in.
A further assumption we make is that each user has a secure and authenticated channel of communication with the servers. Therefore we assume that Alice cannot masquer;~de as Bob and obtain access permission by this.
The protocol ACP of figure 1 shows how to transform an SSS to an access control mechanism. We use the standa.rd notion of a pseudo-random function (PRF), cf. [16, 28] .
The Notion of Security
To specify the security of a cryptographic scheme we should describe (i) the type of attack assumed, i.e., the power of the ~dversary, and (ii) what is meant by breaking the system, 1.e., what tasks the adversary can perform as a result of the attack that it could not perform before. Usually there is some "ideal" situation that we are trying to imitate. In the case of encryption of messages, a common metaphor used for the ideal is a sealed envelope. Below we first specify the model of the ideal environment and then the model of the given environment. The notion of security shall be that for any computational challenge and every user operating in the latter environment, there is a user in the ideal environment that has the same probability of succeeding in the challenge. This is an adaptation of semantic security for the scenario considered in this paper.
In our scenario, the ideal situation is when a user Alice' interacts with the database as a black box, requesting and obtaining information about records in the database. Alice' gets no information (concealed or other) about records she does not specifically request. At some point her access privileges are revoked and she gets no more information about the database. Her challenge is to compute some function G of the contents of the database (including both the parts that were revealed to her and those that were concealed). Depending on the distribution of the database, her requests, and the function G, she has a certain probability of answering this challenge correctly.
Consider now a user Alice using protocol ACP. We assume that her computational power is that of a probabilistic Turing machine whose running time is polynomial (in some security parameter). Alice has the complete encrypted database D as input from the data servers. Alice first performs t authorized rounds of:
• She adaptively chooses a data index xi, and a set Aj E A(Q) containing a quorum (based on the entire history). She requests access to item Xj from all the servers in Aj according to ACP.
• The servers i E Aj generate the shares and send them to Alice, i.e., she can then decrypt D(xi)· Then her authorization is revoked, so she performs l further rounds of the same type, however now she chooses the set Zi ¢ A(Q) (since in every quorum some server will refuse her request). Again all the servers in Zi send her their shares of the requested item xi.
Let G be a function on t + l variables. At the end of the t + l rounds, Alice computes a guess g of the value G(y(xt), ... , y(Xt+t)), based on the database contents of the indices she requested. 
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Proof 
I
Proof of property 2: We must show how to construct Alice', given a description of Alice. The key point will be that if Alice and Alice' have different probabilities of success in evaluating G, than we have a distinguisher between the pseudo-random functions used and truly random functions.
The machine Alice' runs a simulation of Alice. To perform the simulation, Alice' first gives (the simulated) Alice D(2) Then Alice' computes the shares {II;(kj, r)};ez; of this "key" using a random string r, and sends the appropriate parts to Alice. At the end of these l simulated rounds, Alice outputs her guess of the function value G, which Alice' outputs as the guess g'.
Suppose that the probability that Alice' evaluates G correctly is significantly smaller than that of Alice. To obtain a contradiction, consider a machine Alice" that operates in the same environment as Alice, modified so the functions R.y(x) and Keya(x) of protocol ACP are replaced by truly random functions. We claim that the distribution on the communication that Alice" sees and the distribution on the communication that the simulated Alice sees are identical. This is true since the encrypted database is completely random, and by the definition of the SSS II the shares on a set Zj ¢A( Q) are independent of the secret. Therefore the probability that Alice' is correct on G is identical to the probability that Alice" is correct on G.
If the difference in the probabilities of success of Alice and Alice" is non-negligible, then we have a method of distinguishing the pseudo-random functions (R-y(x) and Keya(x)) from truly random functions, which violates the security assumption of PRF's.
Remarks:
• For the proof we required that the database is encrypted by D(x) = y(x) EB Keya(x) (so the simulator would be able to create a random "key" that will decode D(x) into the random value y'). This forces JKeya(x)l to be as long as Jy(x)J, which could be undesirable if the value is, say, a large photograph file. It seems that using Keya(x) as the (short) seed for some other PRF whose (long) output then encrypts the data would yield an equally secure protocol (this is an adaptation of Krawczyk's [25] computational secret sharing). However we do not know how to prove the security of such a modified protocol against an adaptive Alice which dynamically chooses which set Zi to request shares from. (If Alice's choices are fixed in advance, then this scheme can be proved to be secure, and furthermore,, each separate record is semantically secure.)
• Instead of a quorum system as in definition 2.1, we can use it's standard generalization to a read/write system, i.e., a pair of set systems (R, W) such that R n W f:. 0 for any sets R. E n and W E W (cf., [19, 12] ).
With this formullation, the basic paradigm is that to gain access a user must obtain permission from a readquorum R E n. To revoke a user's access, a writequorum W E W must be informed. This allows more flexibility in the choice of systems, however there is a tradeoff between the availability of the read and write operations. For simplicity, we choose to concentrate on regular quorum systems.
Comparison with Alternative Solutions
Given that one desires to separate the access servers from the data servers, and given the idea of using quorums to overcome the problem of outdated servers, protocol ACP is not the only solution. Following is an alternative protocol for the access control problem (with two variants), which is more naive and eliminates the need for quorum secret sharing. Instead, the consistency is enforced by gateways.
Each such gateway holds all the keys to the database.
In the first variant a user Bob requests the key from a gateway. Then the gateway requests authorization from the access servers on Bob's behalf (the gateway needs secure channels of communication with the access servers). If a quorum of access servers authorizes the gateway to honor Bob's request, the gateway sends the key to Bob, in one piece. This can be done since the gateway knows all the keys.
The second variant of this protocol works in the "Kerberos model" [31] . Here again there are gateways which hold all the database keys. In addition, the access servers have a signature scheme 2 which the gateways can verify. In this variant, Bob requests permission from the access servers directly. Each access server that knows Bob to be authorized replies with a signed permission token which Bob collects. Bob then sends all the collected tokens to a gateway. The gateway sends the requested key to Bob after it verifies the signatures on the tokens, and ensures that Bob indeed collected permissions from a quorum of access servers.
In order not to impair the availability and load, many gateways must be used. For example, !J( y'n) gateways are required to obtain an availability and a load roughly equivalent to those of the Paths quorum system of Section 6.1.2. Therefore we see that these alternative solutions require essentially the same amount of trust as ACP protocol, i.e., many servers that hold all the keys. In terms of the computations required, the gateway needs to verify !J(.Vn) signatures, which could be a costly computation, especially if the permission tokens are signed using public-key signatures. Instead, the efficient QSS schemes of Section 6 require the servers to perform only a few XOR operations for share generation. The key reconstruction, which is equally efficient, is performed separately by each user, thus it does not restrict the capacity of the system. Moreover, both gateway-based variants require an extra round of communication, coordinated either by the gateway or by the user. Finally, the introduction of a another type of servers (the gateways) to the system increases its complexity.
We conclude that both variants of this seemingly simple protocol, are in fact inferior to our protocol ACP. Protocol ACP has a lower communication overhead, a similar (or lower) computation complexity, requires less coordination, and has less components. In fact, the alternatives are simpler than our protocol only in that they eliminate the concept of a QSS.
Stronger Notions of Security
Protecting Against Collaborative Attacks
The security ~;uaranteed by Theorem 3.1 is against an attack by a single user. However, as presented, the protocol. is vulnerable to an attack by a set of two (or more) unauthorized collaborating users, as follows. Let V be a set of users unauthorized to access item x. If each user v E V obtains the shares from a different set of servers Zv (none of which contains a quorum), it may be the case that the set Uvev Zv does contain a quorum, so by pooling their information, the users in V can access the database item x.
To protect the data against such an attack, we use a slightly modified protocol, ACP', in which the shares are generated depending both on the requested item x and the requesting user's ID. 
For any set V of users, if for every user v E V some quorum of servers Qv is informed that v is not a,uthorized, then V collectively cannot learn any partial information about the database, in the sense defined in Section 3.2.
Proof Sketch: The only difference from the proof of Theorem 3.1 is noting that a set of shares {sl'}iez. generated by ACP' for any user v f:. Alice and any set of servers Zv not containing a quorum, can be indistinguishably generated by the simulating machine Alice'. 
Ensuring that the Shares Expire
In many applications it is undesirable to let users accumulate shares over a long period of time. As an example, consider how the accounting for such a database could work. A user should be billed for every key she obtains, i.e., for every data item x for which she received shares from a quorum of servers. Therefore, every month (say) the logs from all the servers need to be collected and tallied. If the logs are then deleted, then an authorized user Alice can avoid payment by choosing some quorum Q E Q, requesting one share for item x from some server i E Q in January and requesting the rest of shares from Q \ { i} in February. By this she will not be logged as receiving a quorum of shares during any billing month. The solution to this problem is to generate the shares depending on the item x and on the current time, in much the same way as the user-ID is used in protocol ACP'. Note that the servers must all use the same time value otherwise the key cannot be reconstructed. However, maintaining synchronized clocks is a non-trivial and costly task (cf., [41] ) which we prefer to avoid. Instead, in our modified protocol ACP" (see Figure 3 ) the user attaches a timestamp t to the request for item x, which is then used by the servers in the share generation. This might allow a cheating user to use fake timestamps, so on receiving such a request, the servers verify that the timestamp is "reasonable" before using it. For this purpose we assume that the maximal drift between any legitimate user's clock and a server's clock or between any two servers' clocks is at most 6. (which includes the time delays caused by the communication network). This 6. may be a fairly large value (e.g., 3 hours), as long as it is significantly smaller than the time period between accounting log deletions. Clearly Theorem 3.1 holds for protocol ACP". The following proposition, which we state without proof, shows its additional security guarantee. The statement is in terms of an imaginary global clock that works at the rate of the slowest server's local clock (we are not assuming that all the clocks have the same rate).
Proposition 4.2 Assume that Alice sends a request (t, x)
to server i, using protocol ACP", which is received at global time r and found to be legitimate. Then any request (t, x) 163 {Al) For a message m let SigTI(m) denote the secure signature of m using a private key 'TI· (A2) Let Remark: A request by Alice for the same item x but with a different timestamp t' # t may be honored later, if t' is legitimate. However, as in Theorem 4.1, shares generated for such a request cannot be combined with shares generated for request (t, x ).
Signatures via Quorum Secret Sharing
In this section we show that an SSS II that realizes a quorum access structure A( Q) can be used to build a distributed signature scheme. The model of the user interacting with the servers is identical to that of Section 3, except that there are no data servers. Let us stress that unlike [10] , the faults we allow in the servers are all benign, and therefore our scheme has a high level of trust in them. A server in our scheme that "turns traitor" can generate a complete signature for any message. There are signature servers, which form the universe U. Each server holds a list of all the users it knows to be currently authorized to get signatures, and perhaps some more information, regarding the types of messages which should be signed. Again, it may be the case that a server's authorization list is outdated. Our requirement is that if all the servers in some quorum Q E Q are informed that Alice is no longer authorized to get a signature on message m, then no matter from which set of servers Alice chooses to request a signature, she will not be able to obtain or forge it. This requirement leads naturally to our basic paradigm:
To obtain a signature, a user must. obtain permission from a quorum of servers.
The intersection property of a quorum system then ensures that in any set A E A( Q) (which can collectively sign the message m), at least one server is informed that the request is not legitimate. Our protocol can be based on any signature scheme, without altering the security properties of the scheme. Specifically, consider the "existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks" definition of security, as defined by [17] . Let Sig,.,(m) be a signature scheme obeying this requiremene. Suppose that a user Alice was authorized to get signatures for a while and then this authorization was revoked. Alice should not be able to generate a signature on any message for which it has not received a signature prior to revocation.
The idea of the distributed signature protocol is to imagine a database where at location m the value Sig,.,( m) is stored and apply protocol ACP to that virtual database. The protocol QSig of figure 4 shows in detail how to transform an SSS into a distributed signature scheme. 
If a quorum of servers is informed that Alice's message m' is not legitim<lte, then she cannot generate a signa-
ture for m', unlt~ss she obtained the signature legally beforehand.
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Efficient Quorum Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section we show how to build quorum secret sharing schemes from several known quorum systems, with different availability and load properties. All the schemes we present are extremely efficient, with blowup factors of at most 2 and linear time complexities both for the share generation and secret reconstruction operations. The proofs in this section are deferred to the full paper (see also [35] ).
The Paths System
The System
The Paths system [33] 1 is based on paths in the following grid. 3 Note that using (14] vve can convert any signature scheme into one where each message has a unique signature. See Figure 5 for a drawing of G(d) and G*(d). Note that every edge e E G(d) has a dual edge e* E G*(d) whilch crosses it. We call such e and e* a dual pair of edges.
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Definition 6.2 We identify an element in the Paths quorum system with a dual pair of edges e E G(d) and e* E G*(d). A quorum in the system is the union of {elements identified with) the edges of a left-right path in G(d) and ;the edges of a top-bottom path in G*(d).
In [33] it is shown that the Paths system has an optimal load of .C(Paths) = 0(1/ Vn). It also achieves the highest availability possible for such a load, namely Fp(Paths) = exp( -0( y'n) ). The smallest quorums in the Paths system have cardinality 0( Vn).
The Scheme Paths-SSS
The scheme is based on the construction of Rudich for s ·-t connectivity that was generalized in [24] for span programs. The system elements in the Paths system are the edges of the grid, however we first assign intermediate values to the vertices, from which we compute the shares.
The basic secret unit s is a single bit. The secret is first randomly split into four bits I, r, t and b, such that
IEBrEIHEBb=s.
We describe how the I and r bits are shared by the left- This procedure is now repeated on the dual grid, with bits t and b assigned to the top and bottom vertices, resp., and random values assigned to all the other vertices. The dual edges e* are assigned shares s!~ analogously. Finally, the share of a system element identified with the dual pair of edges e, e* is both the s~r and s~b bits. In order to prove Proposition 6.3 we need to show the reconstruction function for a quorum, and the independence of shares of a non-quorum from the secret. We do this via the following two lemmas. The hierarchical quorum system (HQS) is due to [26] . In this system the elements are the leaves of a complete ternary tree, in which the internal nodes are 2-of-3 majority gates.
In [34] the availability and load of the HQS are analyzed.
It is shown that .C(HQS) = n- The Tree quorum system of [1] can also be described as a ternary tree, with internal nodes which are 2-of-3 majority gates. However only two input lines of each internal majority gate are connected to lower level gates; the middle input line is directly labeled with a system element. Nate that the standard description of this quorum system is via a binary tree; the description given here is from [21] .
The smallest quorums in the Tree are of size log n. In [36, 34] it is shown that the Tree has optimal availability and load among the quorum systems with logarithmic size quorums, 
The Schemes HQS-SSS and Tree-SSS
The building block for both the Tree and HQS systems is the 2-of-3 majority gate, which is a threshold function. As such, it has an SSS, which is Shamir's scheme [40] . However a 2-of-3 majority gate is a very simple case of the general scheme. The underlying field is the G F( 4) field, i.e., the basic secret unit is a pair of bits. The random polynomials of the scheme are simply lines (of degree 1). Therefore both the share generation and secret reconstruction require only the few instructions in G F( 4) arithmetic needed for linear interpolation. Applying this scheme recursively in the natural way, from the root of the tree towards the leaves, yields secret sharing schemes for both the HQS and Tree systems.
Nate that in each internal majority gate, the three shares generated from a secret value s (a pair of bits) are of two bits each. Since in both the Tree and HQS systems each element is identified with a single input line, the shares in the full H QS or Tree scheme are also of two bits each, so there is no blowup, and ,B(HQS-SSS) = ,B(Tree-SSS) = 1. Remark: The above scheme works for any quorum system having a description in the form of a tree of 2-of-3 majority gates, with the system elements labeling the input lines. In [21] it is shown that any maximal quorum system has such a 165 description. However no bounds are shown for the of number times that an element can appear on input lines, so using our scheme on such a description could potentially cause a high blowup.
The Crumbling Wall System
The System
The Crumbling Walls (CW) are a family of quorum systems due to [37] . This family includes, among others, the CWlog system (see Figure 6 ), the grid of [7] and the triangular wall of [27] . The elements of a wall are logically arranged in rows of varying widths. A quorum in a wall is the union of one full row and a representative from every row below the full row.
In the CWlog system, the width of row i is ni = Llg 2i J.
In [37] it is shown that the only high availability wall is the CWlog system. It has small quorums, of size O(log n), and optimal availability and load among the quorum systems with logarithmic size quorums, namely Fp(CWlog) = 0( n -•) for some constant e(p) > 0, and .C(CWlog) = 0(1/logn). 
The Scheme CW-SSS
The AndOr System
The System
The AndOr system a.ppears in [33] , and applies the analysis of AND/OR trees of (43) . Consider a complete rooted binary tree of height h, and identify the n = 2h leaves of the tree with the system elements.
The AndOr system is the conjunction of two monotone boolea~ functions, defined by assigning AND and OR gates to the mternal nodes of the tree, over the same inputs. The gates alternate between AND and OR, level by level. The only difference between the two functions is that one function has an AND gate at the root while the other has an OR gate there.
. In [33) it is shown that this indeed is a quorum system, wtth quorums of size 0( y'n). It has an optimal load of .C(AndOr) = 0(1/..fi"0. The availability is as high as possible, namely Fp(AndOr):::; exp(-11(y'n)) when p < t• and 
The Scheme AndOr-SSS
Since the AndOr system has a very simple description in terms of boolean functions, we can apply the scheme of (3 In (3) it is proved that this is an SSS for any monotone boolean function.
In the formula for the AndOr system each element appears on two input gates (one in each alternating tree), so each element will end with a share of two bits from the original secret bit 5, hence the blowup is ,B(AndOr-SSS) = 2.
Towards Decreasing the Trust
A General Approach
First, we present a simple solution t.o the access control problem, in which a coalition of servers that does not contain a quorum cannot grant access to any data item x. This is a general solution, that works for any quorum access structure. The protocol relies on additional information attached to the database by the dealer, the all-knowing entity that prepares the database.
We assume that every access server i has a PRF E;, and that the dealer knows all the private seeds of these PRF's. However the servers do not have the encryption PRF, Keya(x). The protocol also uses a SSS IT for a quorum access structure .A= A(Q).
When the dealer writes data item x into the database, encrypted by k = Key"' ( x), it also creates all n shares { s; = IT;(k,r)}r=l• using a random (or private pseudo-random) string r. Then the dealer generates the values F; ( x) = E; ( x) EEl s; using the servers' PRF's, and attaches the set of {F;(x)}r=l to the data item x.
The access server's role is extremely simple. 
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. It is not hard to see that this protocol has minimal trust m the servers. In fact, any set Z It A( Q) of malicious servers can learn nothing about the contents of the database, in the sense of Section 3.2. However the protocol has several drawbacks:
• rr:he siz~ ?f each data item is increased by n ·I Key" ( x) I btts. 1. his makes the protocol ridiculous if we make ~he assumptions of protocol ACP, namely that the key IS as long as the data item itself, since the datalbase size increases by a factor of n + 1. However if the key is much shorter than the data (d. (25] ), then this overhea.d can be tolerated.
• The protocol is not flexible, in that it requires the number of servers n and their private functions E; to be fixed when the database is created .
• The protocol cannot be used as a group signature scheme since this would require the dealer to pre-compute and ' store every possible signature in advance.
• As presented, the scheme is vulnerable to the attacks mentioned in Section 4, namely collaborating users can access the data, and keys do not expire. 
The Case of the Paths System
Here we construct another access control protocol based specifically on the scheme Paths-SSS of Section 6.l. This protocol has the same security guarantee as that of the general ACP protocol (Theorem 3.1). However it needs less trust and can tolerate some malicious servers. More Recall that the elements (servers) are identified with dual pairs of grid edges. Therefore a server identified with the dual edges e = (v1,v2) and e* = (u1 ,u2 ) is given the four PRF's that were placed at the vertices v 1 , v2 , u1 , tt 2 • The share that such a server generates for item x is comprised of a left-right share, s~ = Kv 1 (x) EEl Kv 2 (x) and a top-bottom share, 5~~ = Ku 1 (x) EEl Ku 2 (x).
As in Proposition 6.3, if e1, ... , ep is a left-right path in G(d) then s~, EEl··· EEls~ = Kt(x) EEl Kr(x), and simil2~rly on the dual grid. Therefore by collecting the shares from a quorum of servers, the user can reconstruct the key and access the data item.
A moment's reflection shows that Theorem 3.1 holds for this protocol as well. However here we have the stronger guarantee of the following proposition. Call T = U 1 <j< 4 Tj the set of trusted servers, and call R = U \ T the set of regular servers. Clearly ITI < 4y'n. If Z is a coalition of traitor servers, then some immediate corollaries of Proposition 7.1 are:
• If Z ~ R then Z can learn nothir:g of the database.
• If IZI = 1 then Z can learn nothing of the database.
• If IZI = 2 and Z is not a pair of diagonally opposite corners, then Z can learn nothing of the database.
• If all four corners are not traitors, and IZI < 4, then Z can learn nothing of the database.
Open Problems
This work suggests several lines of research, which we outline below.
• Make the protocols work with less trust. Ideally, assume that a subset of the access servers are faulty and pool together all their information. Find an efficient scheme to protect the information so that a faulty set of the access servers that does not contain a quorum can learn nothing about the database, but from a set of the servers that includes a quorum it is easy to extract a key for decrypting any database item x 4
• Note that the availability measures the probability that the faulty processors contain a quorum system (assuming that each processor becomes faulty independently with probability p ).
• We have found secret sharing schemes for many interesting quorum systems (falling into the category of span programs), however there are some for which it is not clear whether a good scheme exists, for example the projective plane [29] . Find secret sharing schemes for these quorum systems, or better, derive a general construction.
• In the remarks following the proof of Theorem 3.1 we pointed out a delicate problem: what happens when there are many large files encrypted on, say, a CD-ROM, and keys for decrypting them may be obtained for a fee. After some keys have been obtained, how secure are the remaining files? If the keys encrypting the files are chosen independently, then ~t first it seems obvious that nothing can be learned about the other files. However, note that the files are opened at the user's request after seeing their encrypted versions.
To the best of our knowledge, the common definition of security of encryption (semantic, see [15, 28] ) does not allow us to conclude the following: if the keys for decrypting 50 out of the 100 files (say) are given, then nothing can be learned about the remaining 50 files. Find either a way of showing that the security of the remaining files does follow from the semantic security of the encryption scheme, or find an encryption scheme for which you can prove the security with keys which are significantly shorter than the files themselves.
